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12 Elaine Oxina

13 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
14 **SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

15 **ELAINE OXINA;**
16 **INDIVIDUALLY AND ON**
BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED,

17 Plaintiff,

18
19 v.

20 **LANDS' END, INC.,**

21
22 Defendant.
23

Case No.: 3:14-cv-02577-MMA-NLS

CLASS ACTION

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
JOINT MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF
CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT

DATE: March 21, 2016

TIME: 2:30 p.m.

CRTRM: 3A

JUDGE: Hon. Michael M. Anello

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1 Plaintiff Elaine Oxina (“Plaintiff”) hereby submits the instant Motion for
2 Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement of this action (the “Action”).

3 **I. INTRODUCTION**

4 This consumer class action arises from Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant
5 engaged in false and misleading advertising, unfair competition, and deceptive conduct
6 toward consumers by advertising Defendant’s neckties, including the necktie
7 purchased by Plaintiff, with the false representation that Defendant’s product was
8 “Made in U.S.A.” in violation of, *inter alia*, California’s Unfair Competition Law
9 (“UCL”) Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.; California’s False Advertising Law
10 (“FAL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500, et seq.; and California’s “Made in USA”
11 law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17533.7; and California’s Consumers Legal Remedies
12 Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 1750, et seq.

13
14 The parties have reached a settlement in principal and have drafted a proposed
15 Settlement Agreement for the Court’s approval (the “Settlement” or “SA”), attached to
16 the Declaration of Abbas Kazerounian in Support of Preliminary Approval of Class
17 Action Settlement (“Kazerounian Decl.”) as Exhibit 1. The proposed Settlement
18 provides substantial relief to the Class as each Settlement Class Member shall be
19 eligible to receive a full refund of the purchase price of the product at issue in addition
20 to interest at the rate of ten (10) percent per annum from the date of purchase without
21 making a claim. Kazerounian Decl. ¶12; Swigart Decl. ¶ 3; SA § 6a. In consideration
22 for payment, Plaintiff, on behalf of the proposed Settlement Class, will dismiss the
23 Action and the Settlement class will release and discharge the Released Parties from
24 the Released Claims. *Id.* § 13. For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff assert that the
25 Settlement is fair and reasonable, and warrants the Court’s preliminary approval; and
26 Defendant does not oppose this motion.

1 Accordingly, Plaintiff moves the Court for an Order preliminarily approving of
2 the Settlement Class Action Settlement, requesting an Order of (1) preliminary
3 approval of the proposed Settlement Agreement, (2) approval the proposed Notice
4 procedure an the form, manner and content of the Notice, (3) staying all proceedings
5 until the Court renders a final decision regarding the approval of the Settlement, (4)
6 conditionally certify the proposed Settlement Class, (5) appointing Plaintiff as Class
7 Representatives and Plaintiff’ Counsel as Class Counsel, and (6) scheduling a hearing
8 for Final Approval.

9
10 **II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

11 Plaintiff has alleged in this Action that Defendant engaged in false and
12 misleading advertising, unfair competition, and deceptive conduct toward consumers
13 by advertising Defendant’s neckties, including the necktie purchased by Plaintiff, with
14 the false representation that Defendant’s product was “Made in U.S.A.” in violation
15 of, *inter alia*, California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
16 §§ 17200, et seq.; California’s False Advertising Law (“FAL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
17 §§ 17500, et seq.; and California’s “Made in USA” law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§
18 17533.7; and California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Code
19 § 1750, et seq.

20 Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that contrary to Defendant’s claim that its Kid’s
21 to-be tied Necktie (hereinafter “Necktie” or the “Product”) was advertised on
22 Defendant’s website as “Made in U.S.A.” while the Product was in fact made in China,
23 and thus foreign-made and/or incorporates foreign-made materials or component parts,
24 contrary to Defendant’s representations. *See* Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint
25 (“SAC”) ¶¶ 1 and 3.

26 In response to the Action, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on January 26,
27 2015. [Dkt. No. 11]. On February 17, 2015, Plaintiff filed her Response in Opposition
28

1 to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. [Dkt No. 12]. Defendant filed a Reply on February
2 23, 2015. Thereafter, on June 19, 2015, the Court issued an order granting
3 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss without prejudice and with Leave to Amend.
4 Subsequently, Plaintiff filed her Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), which is now
5 the operative complaint in the Action.

6 **III. THE SETTLEMENT**

7 **A. The Settlement Class**

8 Plaintiff has agreed to settle this action on behalf of all other similarly situated
9 consumers in California who, at any time from October 29, 2010 through October 29,
10 2014, purchased the “Kids To-Be-Tied Plaid Necktie” in the State of California (the
11 “Settlement Class”). SA § I. Defendant has represented to Plaintiff that the Settlement
12 Class consists of 38 consumers. *Id.* Excluded from the Settlement Class are all persons
13 who are employees, directors, officers, and agents of Defendants or its subsidiaries and
14 affiliated companies, the Court and its immediate family and staff, as well as any
15 person(s) who timely exercise their right to opt out of the Settlement Class. *Id.* § J.

16 **B. Settlement Payment**

17 The parties have agreed to the proposed Settlement which, if approved by this
18 Honorable Court, will result in the dismissal of the Action in consideration for
19 payment of the Settlement Funds to the Members of the Settlement Class. Under the
20 terms of the Settlement Agreement, in consideration for the dismissal of the Lawsuit
21 under the terms of this Agreement, the Parties agree as follows:

- 22
- 23 i. Settlement Class Members shall be eligible to receive a refund of
24 their purchase price plus interest at the rate of ten (10) percent per
25 annum from the date of purchase, without making a claim.
 - 26 ii. Lands’ End will administer payment to the Settlement Class
27 through its customer service department and all costs and expenses
28

1 of class notice and administration of claims shall be paid and borne
2 by Lands' End outside of the compensation being offered to Class
3 Members; and send a Declaration to Class Counsel of the timing
4 and results of the refund within ten (10) days of issuance.

5 iii. If Lands' End and Plaintiff's Counsel are unable to resolve any
6 disputes concerning the administration of the claims, those disputes
7 may be submitted to the Honorable Nita L. Stormes.
8

9 The Parties have agreed to undertake their respective Best Efforts to effectuate
10 the Settlement as described herein and in the proposed Settlement Agreement.
11 Accordingly, the parties encourage the Court to approve the proposed Settlement
12 Agreement. The parties further represent, agree and acknowledge that the Settlement is
13 a fair resolution of these claims for the Parties and the Settlement Class Members. SA
14 § 7.

15 **C. Notice and Administration of the Settlement**

16 As provided in the proposed Settlement Agreement, the parties agree that no
17 later than 30 days following the Court's entry of the Order of Preliminary Approval,
18 Lands' End shall cause notice to be disseminated as directed in the Order of
19 Preliminary Approval by sending Settlement Class Members direct notice by e-mail
20 and U.S. Mail to all Members of the Settlement Class for whom it has a valid e-mail
21 address and to the last known mailing address contained in Lands' End's records. SA §
22 4.

23 The parties agree that the method of notice set forth in the Settlement
24 Agreement constitutes the best form of notice to the Settlement Class that is
25 practicable under the circumstances. SA § 4. Lands' End shall pay all costs associated
26 with disseminating and publishing the Notice to the Settlement Class and all associated
27 expenses, which shall be in addition to and not deducted from the settlement
28

1 compensation described in Section 6 of the Settlement Agreement or the amount of
2 attorneys' fees and expenses described in Section 12 of the Settlement Agreement. *Id.*

3 **D. Opportunity to Object or Opt Out**

4 Under the terms of the proposed Settlement Agreement, members of the
5 Settlement Class will have the right to object to the Settlement and/or its terms. SA §
6 8. Any Settlement Class Member who wishes to object to any term of this Agreement
7 must do so in writing by filing a written objection with the Clerk of the Court and
8 mailing it to the Parties' respective counsel at the addresses set forth in the Settlement
9 Agreement. Any such objection must (a) identify the date on which the objecting party
10 purchased a "Kids To-Be-Tied Plaid Necktie" in the state of California, (b) attach
11 copies of any materials that will be submitted to the Court or presented at the fairness
12 hearing, (c) be signed by the Settlement Class Member, (d) clearly state in detail (i) the
13 legal and factual ground(s) for the objection, (ii) the Settlement Class Member's name,
14 address and telephone number, and (iii) if represented by counsel, such counsel's
15 name, address and telephone number; and (e) Any attorney representing an objector
16 must list all objections previously filed for anyone, the case name, court, and case
17 number, and how much, if any amount, was paid in connection with the objection. Any
18 objection that fails to satisfy the requirements of this Section, or that is not properly
19 and timely submitted, may be deemed ineffective, and will be deemed by the Parties to
20 have been waived, and the Parties will argue that the Settlement Class Member
21 asserting such objection shall be bound by the final determination of the Court.
22

23 In addition, any Settlement Class Member who wishes to be excluded from
24 membership in the Settlement Class must do so in writing by mailing a written request
25 for exclusion from the Settlement to the Parties' respective counsel at the addresses set
26 forth in the Settlement Agreement. SA § 10. Such requests must (a) be signed by the
27 Settlement Class Member, (b) identify the date on which the Settlement Class Member
28

1 purchased a “Kids To-Be-Tied Plaid Necktie” in the state of California, (c) clearly
2 express the Settlement Class Member’s desire to be excluded (or to “opt out”) from the
3 Settlement Class, and (d) include the Settlement Class Member’s name, address and
4 telephone number, and, if represented by counsel, counsel’s name, address and
5 telephone number. *Id.* Any request for exclusion that is untimely or fails to satisfy the
6 requirements of the Settlement Agreement, may be deemed ineffective, and the person
7 shall be deemed a Settlement Class Member for all purposes under this Agreement. *Id.*

8 **E. Class Counsel’s Application for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs**

9 The proposed Settlement contemplates that Class Counsel shall be entitled to
10 apply to the Court for an award of attorneys’ fees, costs. SA § 12. Lands’ End agrees
11 not to oppose an award by the Court of reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation costs
12 through the entry of the Final Order and Judgment, to Plaintiff’s Counsel in an amount
13 not to exceed \$32,500 in fees and expenses, subject to Court approval. Plaintiff’s
14 Counsel agrees that they will not seek attorneys’ fees and litigation costs that exceed
15 \$32,500, in the aggregate. Plaintiff’s Counsel’s application for an award of attorneys’
16 fees and costs pursuant to this subsection shall be made no later than thirty (30) days
17 prior to any opt out or objection period. Such application will be heard at the time of
18 the Fairness Hearing or as soon thereafter as may be determined by the Court. *Id.* §
19 12a. The parties’ negotiation and agreement upon the foregoing attorneys’ fees and
20 expenses occurred only after the substantive terms of the proposed Settlement
21 Agreement had been negotiated and agreed upon. *Id.* § 12b.

22 **IV. LEGAL STANDARD FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS**
23 **ACTION SETTLEMENT**

24 A class action may not be dismissed, compromised or settled without the
25 approval of the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). The purpose of the Court’s preliminary
26 evaluation of the settlement is to determine whether it is within the “range of
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28

1 reasonableness,” and thus whether notice to the class of the terms and conditions of the
2 settlement, and the scheduling of a formal fairness hearing, are worthwhile. *See* 4
3 Herbert B. Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* § 11.25 et seq., and § 13.64 (4th ed.
4 2002 and Supp. 2004). Thus, the “judge must make a preliminary determination on the
5 fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the settlement terms and must direct the
6 preparation of notice of the certification, proposed settlement, and date of the final
7 fairness hearing.” *Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth)* (Fed. Judicial Center 2004)
8 (“Manual”) at § 21.632.

9
10 **A. Public Policy Favors Settlement**

11 As a matter of public policy, settlement is a strongly favored method for resolving
12 disputes. *See Utility Reform Project v. Bonneville Power Admin.*, 869 F.2d 437, 443 (9th
13 Cir. 1989); *Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Comm’n*, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir.
14 1982). This is especially true in class actions such as this one. As a result, courts should
15 exercise their discretion to approve settlements “in recognition of the policy encouraging
16 settlement of disputed claims.” *In re Prudential Sec. Inc. Ltd. Partnerships Litig.*, 163
17 F.R.D. 200, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). To make the preliminary fairness determination,
18 courts may consider several relevant factors, including “the strength of the plaintiffs’
19 case; the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; the risk of
20 maintaining class action status through trial; the amount offered in settlement; the extent
21 of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings; [and] the experience and views
22 of counsel...” *Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998).

23 **B. Conclusions of Fact And Law Are Not Necessary At This Stage**

24 Furthermore, courts must give “proper deference to the private consensual
25 decision of the parties,” since “the court’s intrusion upon what is otherwise a private
26 consensual agreement negotiated between the parties to a lawsuit must be limited to
27 the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product
28

1 of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the
2 settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.” *Id.* at
3 1027.

4 In considering a potential settlement, the Court need not reach any ultimate
5 conclusions on the issues of fact and law, which underlie the merits of the dispute, (*West*
6 *Va. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.*, 440 F.2d 1079, 1086 (2d Cir. 1971)), and need not engage in a
7 trial on the merits, *Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Comm’n*, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th
8 Cir. 1982). Preliminary approval is merely the prerequisite to giving notice so that “the
9 proposed settlement...may be submitted to members of the prospective class for their
10 acceptance or rejection.” *Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary*
11 *Corp.*, 323 F. Supp. 364, 372 (E.D. Pa. 1970). Preliminary approval of the settlement
12 should be granted if there are no “reservations about the settlement, such as unduly
13 preferential treatment of class representatives or segments of the class, inadequate
14 compensation or harms to the classes, the need for subclasses, or excessive compensation
15 for attorneys.” Manual at § 21.632.

16
17 **C. Counsel’s Experienced Judgment Holds Considerable Weight**

18 The opinion of experienced counsel supporting the Settlement is entitled to
19 considerable weight.¹ The decision to approve or reject a proposed settlement “is
20 committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge[.]” *See Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1026.
21 This discretion is to be exercised “in light of the strong judicial policy that favors
22 settlements, particularly where complex class action litigation is concerned,” which
23 minimizes substantial litigation expenses for both sides and conserves judicial
24

25 ¹ *See e.g., Kirkorian v. Borelli*, 695 F. Supp. 446, 451 (N.D. Cal.1988) (opinion of
26 experienced counsel carries significant weight in the court’s determination of the
27 reasonableness of the settlement); *Boyd v. Bechtel Corp.*, 485 F. Supp. 610, 622 (N.D.
28 Cal. 1979) (recommendations of plaintiffs’ counsel should be given a presumption of
reasonableness).

1 resources. *See Linney v. Cellular Alaska P’ship*, 151 F.3d 1234, 1238 (9th Cir. 1998)
2 (quotations omitted).

3 Based on these standards, Class Counsel respectfully submit that, for the reasons
4 detailed below, the Court should preliminarily approve the proposed Settlement as fair,
5 reasonable and adequate. Kazerounian Decl. ¶ 32; Swigart Decl. ¶ 3. Defendant,
6 through its counsel, joins in this submission for Preliminary Approval. SA § 3.

7 **V. THE SETTLEMENT IS FAIR, REASONABLE, ADEQUATE AND**
8 **SHOULD BE PRELIMINARILY APPROVED BY THE COURT**

9 **A. Liability is Contested and Both Parties Face Significant Challenges in**
10 **Litigating the Action**

11 Based on Class Counsel’s thorough analysis of the legal and factual issues raised
12 by this case in Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. No. 11], the Court’s resulting
13 Order [Dkt. No. 15], and Defendant’s subsequent Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. No. 21],
14 this litigation has reached the stage where “the Parties certainly have a clear view of
15 the strengths and weaknesses of their cases” sufficient to support the Settlement. *Boyd*
16 *v. Bechtel Corp.*, 485 F.Supp 610, 617 (N.D. Cal. 1979). Based on their experience
17 with these types of cases and analysis of the issues raised in this action in Defendant’s
18 Motions to Dismiss, the parties share the view that this is a fair and reasonable
19 settlement and in the best interests of the Class. Because of the detailed legal and
20 actual analysis conducted by counsel for both parties, their endorsement of the
21 Settlement “is entitled to significant weight” in deciding whether to approve the
22 Settlement. *Fisher Bros. v. Cambridge Lee Industries, Inc.*, 630 F.Supp. 482, 488 (E.D.
23 Pa. 1985); *Ellis v. Naval Air Rework Facility*, 87 F.R.D. 15, 18 (N.D. Cal.1980); *Boyd*
24 *v. Bechtel Corp.*, 485 F.Supp. 616-617. Courts should not substitute their judgment for
25 that of the proponents, particularly where, as here, settlement has been reached with
26 the participation of experienced counsel familiar with the litigation. *National Rural*
27

1 *Telecommunications Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc.*, 221 F.R.D. 523, 528 (C.D. Cal. 2004).

2 Here, in evaluating the settlement set forth in this Agreement, Plaintiff's
3 Counsel have concluded that the benefits provided to the Settlement Class under this
4 Agreement make a settlement with Lands' End and the other Released Parties pursuant
5 to such terms and conditions in the best interest of the Settlement Class in light of,
6 among other considerations, the benefits afforded to the Settlement Class, the
7 uncertainty associated with obtaining class certification for liability purposes, the
8 expense and length of time necessary to prosecute this action through trial, and the
9 uncertainty of the outcome of the Action. Accordingly, the parties respectfully request
10 that this Court preliminarily approve the Class Settlement.
11

12 **B. The Settlement Provides Fair and Substantial Benefit to the Class**

13 Defendant will provide Settlement Class Members with a full refund of their
14 purchase price plus interest at the rate of ten (10) percent per annum from the date of
15 purchase, without the need for Settlement Class Members to make a claim. *See* SA §
16 6a. Defendant will administer payment to the Settlement Class through its customer
17 service department and all costs and expenses of class notice and administration of
18 claims shall be paid and borne by Lands' End outside of the compensation being
19 offered to Class Members. *See* SA § 6b.

20 The Settlement payment that each Settlement Class Member will receive is fair,
21 appropriate, and reasonable given the purposes of the consumer protection laws at
22 issue in this action and in light of the anticipated risk, expense, and uncertainty of
23 continued litigation. Kazerounian Decl., ¶ 13 & 30; Swigart Decl. ¶ 3. Furthermore,
24 Class Counsel submits that the proposed Settlement is the best result possible, as
25 Settlement Class Members will receive a return of 100 cents on the dollar, in addition
26 to the rate of ten (10) percent per annum from the date of purchase without making a
27 claim. Kazerounian Decl. ¶ 12; Swigart Decl. ¶ 3. SA § 6a. Therefore, the Settlement
28

1 largely achieves the best recovery that Plaintiffs could achieve at trial, without he risks
2 and inherent delays of an adverse trial decision or potential appeal. Moreover, the
3 Settlement Class Members will also benefit from the effect of this Settlement, as it has
4 a deterrent effect and sets a precedent for other businesses that misrepresent their
5 products as “Made in USA” (or similar words). *See Lo v. Oxnard European Motors,*
6 *LLC*, 2012 WL 1932283, *5 (S.D. Cal., May 29, 2012) (class members will also
7 benefit from the deterrent effect of the Settlement). Thus, the Settlement will provide
8 substantial benefit to the Settlement Class Members.

9
10 **C. The Settlement Was Reached As A Result of Arms-Length Negotiations**

11 Typically, “[t]here is a presumption of fairness when a proposed class
12 settlement, which was negotiated at arm's-length by counsel for the class, is presented
13 for Court approval.” NEWBERG, *supra*, §11.41; see also *Nat'l Rural Telecomm.*
14 *Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc.*, 221 F.R.D. 523, 528 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (great weight given to
15 the recommendation of counsel who are the most closely acquainted with the facts of
16 the litigation); *In re Employee Benefit Plans Secs. Litig.*, No. 3-92-708, 1993 WL
17 330595, at *5 (D. Minn. June 2, 1993) (same).

18 Here, the proposed Settlement is the result of intensive arms-length negotiations.
19 *See* SA p. 2. The parties have actively litigated the Action for over a year, including
20 engaging in extensive, adversarial motion practice. Kazerounian Decl. ¶ 10; Swigart
21 Decl. ¶ 3; *see* Dkt. Nos. 11-21. Working independently of the Court, the Parties also
22 participated in direct discussions about possible resolution of this litigation including
23 numerous telephonic conferences, and were able to reach a Settlement. *Id.* After
24 reaching an agreement in principle to settle the Action, Class Counsel engaged in
25 extensive discussions that were necessary to determine the details surrounding the
26 Settlement Agreement. Kazerounian Decl. ¶ 10 & 11; Swigart Decl. ¶ 3.

1 **D. Experienced Counsel Have Determined That The Settlement is**
2 **Appropriate and Fair to the Class**

3 In negotiating the proposed Settlement, Plaintiff has had the benefit of highly
4 skilled counsel, with extensive experience in litigating complex class action litigation.
5 Class Counsel has extensive experience in class actions, as well as particular expertise
6 in class actions relating to consumer protection. Kazerounian Decl. ¶¶ 34-43; Swigart
7 Decl. ¶¶ 4-14. Similarly, Defendant’s Counsel has extensive experience based upon a
8 long track record in complex class action litigation.² Class Counsel believe that under
9 the circumstances, the proposed Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and in the
10 best interest of the Class Members. Kazerounian Decl. ¶ 31; Swigart Decl. ¶ 3.

11 **VI. THE COURT SHOULD PRELIMINARILY CERTIFY THE CLASS**
12 **AS THE REQUIREMENTS OF FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) ARE MET.**

13 **A. Numerosity**

14 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) requires that certification be supported by a class “so
15 numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” *Little dove*, 2001 WL 42199, at
16 * 2, citing *East Texas Motor Freight Sys. V. Rodriguez*, 431 U.S. 395, 405 (1977). In
17 addition, the impracticality of joinder depends on the facts and circumstances of each
18 case and does not, as a matter of law, require the existence of any specific minimum
19 number of class members. *Kraszewski v. State Farms Ins. Co.*, 1981 WL 26982, *2
20 (N.D. Cal., September 9, 1981). The courts of this Circuit have adhered to the view
21 that, “the difficulty inherent in joining as few as 40 class members should raise a
22 presumption that joinder is impracticable, and the plaintiff whose class is that large or
23 larger should meet the test of Rule 23(a)(1) on that fact alone.” *Anone v. Aveiro*, 226
24 F.R.D. 677, 684 (D. Haw. 2005) *quoting* Newberg and Conte, *Newberg on Class*
25 *Actions* § 3.6 (4th ed. 2002).

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27
28 ² See <http://www.gtlaw.com/Experience/Practices/Class-Action-Litigation>

1 Because Defendant, Lands’ End, is a large American clothing retailer that sells
2 its products nationwide and internationally,³ and the product at issue in this Action is a
3 mass-produced product which was advertised and distributed to consumers in the same
4 way via Defendant’s website with the same “Made in USA” representation, the class is
5 so numerous that the joinder of all members would be impracticable. As such, the
6 numerosity requirement under Rule 23(a)(1) has been satisfied.

7 **B. Commonality**

8 Rule 23(a)(2) requires that the class members’ claims be linked through
9 common questions of law or fact. “Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate
10 that the class members have suffered the same injury.” *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes*,
11 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011). This means that the Settlement Class Members’ claims
12 “must depend on a common contention . . . of such a nature that it is capable of
13 classwide resolution – which means that determination of its truth or falsity will
14 resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.”
15 *Id.* A common nucleus of operative fact is generally enough to satisfy the commonality
16 requirement. *Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998). “The
17 existence of shared legal issues with divergent factual predicates is sufficient, as is a
18 common core of salient facts coupled with disparate legal remedies within the class.”
19 *Id.*

20
21 Here, the commonality requirement is met for the Class because the claims of all
22 Class Members arise from the same common questions of both law and fact
23 concerning the “Made in USA” representation Defendant’s made regarding its product.
24 Every prospective class member purchased and viewed the same “Made in USA”
25 representation advertised on Defendant’s website. Plaintiff’s Complaint addresses the
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27 ³ See <http://www.landsend.com/aboutus/company/>
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1 following legal issues and each applies equally to each and every member of the class,
2 namely:

- 3 1. Whether Defendant participated in or committed the wrongful conduct
4 alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint;
- 5 2. Whether Defendant’s acts, transactions, or course of conduct
6 constituted violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law
7 (“UCL”) Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.; California’s False
8 Advertising Law (“FAL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500, et seq.;
9 and California’s “Made in USA” law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§
10 17533.7; and California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”),
11 Cal. Civ. Code § 1750, et seq.
- 12 3. Whether members of the Class sustained and/or continue to sustain
13 damages attributable to Defendant’s conduct, and, if so, the proper
14 measure and appropriate formula to be applied in determining such
15 damages; and
- 16 4. Whether members of the Class are entitled to injunctive and/or
17 equitable relief.

18
19 Consequently, the determination of these common legal issues will resolve an issue that
20 is central to the validity of each one of the claims on a class wide basis in “one stroke.”
21 Therefore, the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) is satisfied.

22 **C. Typicality**

23 Rule 23(a)(3) requires that the proposed Class Representatives’ “claims or
24 defenses” be “typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
25 The typicality requirement is intended to “assure that the interest of the named
26 representative aligns with the interests of the class.” *Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp.*,
27 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992). Courts consistently find that the typicality
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1 requirement is met if the claims arise from a common course of conduct. A named
2 Plaintiff’s claim is typical if “it arises from the same practice or course of conduct that
3 gives rise to the claims of other class members and is based on the same legal theory as
4 their claims.” *Newman v. CheckRite California, Inc.*, 1996 WL 1118092, *5 (E.D.
5 Cal., August 2, 1996). Typicality is so closely related to commonality that “a finding
6 of one will generally satisfy the other.” *Newman*, 1996 WL 1118092, at *5, citing H.
7 Newberg, *Class Actions*, § 3.13 (1997).

8
9 Here, each and every member of the proposed class is alleged to have purchased
10 the same product and viewed the same “Made in USA” representation on Defendant’s
11 website in connection with purchase of the product at issue. Thus, each member of the
12 Class has the very same claims against the Defendant arising from the same common
13 course of conduct, and each of those claims would be susceptible to the same defenses.
14 Plaintiff respectfully submits that, since the claims of all Class members, including the
15 Plaintiff, arise from the same event, practice or course of conduct, namely, the
16 purchase of Defendant’s product advertised with a “Made in USA” representation from
17 Defendant’s website, typicality is satisfied.

18 **D. Fair and Adequate Representation**

19 The Ninth Circuit recognizes two criteria for determining fairness and adequacy
20 of representation under Rule 23(a)(4): “First, the named representatives must appear
21 able to prosecute the action vigorously through qualified counsel, and second, the
22 representatives must not have antagonistic or conflicting interests with the unnamed
23 members of the class.” *Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc.*, 582 F.2d 507, 512 (9th
24 Cir. 1978). As the U.S. Supreme Court has held, “a class representative must be part of
25 the class and ‘posses the same interest and suffer the same injury’ as the class
26 members.” *East Texas Motor Freight System Inc. v. Rodriguez*, 431 U.S. 395, 403
27 (1977); *Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp.*, 563 F.3d 948, 959 (9th Cir. 2009).

1 Plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated her desire and ability to vigorously
2 prosecute this action. Declaration of Elaine Oxina (“Oxina Decl.”), ¶ 3; Kazerounian
3 Decl. ¶¶ 21-23; Swigart Decl. ¶ 3. Since the case’s inception, Plaintiff has maintained
4 regular contact with her counsel and has remained available and accessible to them. *Id.*
5 Plaintiff recognizes that, as the named Plaintiff, she must represent all consumers in
6 the Class. Oxina Decl. ¶ 1; *Id.*; *Id.* Plaintiff’s interests are aligned with those of the
7 other Class Members and there have been no indication or suggestion that their
8 interests may conflict with the interests of unnamed Class Members. Oxina Decl. ¶ 6;
9 *Id.*; *Id.*

10
11 For the foregoing reasons, the Court must conclude that Plaintiff has and will
12 continue to provide fair and adequate class representation in satisfaction of the fourth
13 prong of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).

14 Appointment of Class Counsel is one of the obligations of the trial court. The
15 Court may consider any “matter pertinent to counsel’s ability to fairly and adequately
16 represent the interests of the class,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(B). However, Fed. R. Civ.
17 P. 23(g)(1)(A) sets forth four (4) factors which must be considered by the Court in
18 order to satisfy its obligations. Those factors are: (i) the work counsel has done in
19 identifying or investigating potential claims in the action; (ii) counsel’s experience in
20 handling class actions, other complex litigation, and types of claims asserted in the
21 action; (iii) counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law; and (iv) the resources that
22 counsel will commit to representing the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(A).

23 In evaluating the adequacy of representation, the court may also examine the
24 attorney’s professional qualifications, skills, experience and resources. *See Newman v.*
25 *CheckRite California, Inc.*, 1996 WL 118092, *6 (E.D. Cal., Aug. 2 1996) (citing
26 *North American Acceptance Corp. v. Arnall, Golden & Gregory*, 593 F.2 d 642 (5th
27 Cir. 1979)). The Court is entitled to look to counsel’s demonstrated performance in this
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1 suit in rendering its determination. Assessment of the quality of the pleadings and
2 motions presented during the course of the litigation can be a useful tool in assessing
3 adequacy of counsel. See *Sullivan v. Chase Inv. Serv. Of Boston*, 79 F.R.D. 246, 258
4 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (citing *Wofford v. Safeway stores, Inc.*, 78 F.R.D. 46 0, 486-487
5 (N.D. Cal 1978)).

6 This Court should find that the counsel chosen by Plaintiff meets the standards
7 imposed by Rule 23. Kazerouni Law Group, APC, and Hyde & Swigart have extensive
8 experience in consumer class actions and other complex litigation. Kazerouni Law
9 Group, APC has engaged exclusively in the area of consumer rights litigation and class
10 action litigation. Kazerounian Decl. ¶¶ 34-43; Swigart Decl. ¶¶ 4-14.

11 From the outset, Kazerouni Law Group, APC and Hyde & Swigart have
12 vigorously pursued this action on behalf of Plaintiff and the proposed class members
13 and have demonstrated their ability to do so before this court and have worked
14 diligently with Defendant’s Counsel in reaching a meaningful settlement in the best
15 interest of all the parties. Finally, Defendant does not oppose the appointment of
16 Kazerouni Law Group, APC and Hyde & Swigart to represent the proposed class. As
17 such, Plaintiff’s Counsel, Abbas Kazerounian of Kazerouni Law Group, APC and
18 Joshua B. Swigart of Hyde & Swigart, should be appointed as Class Counsel.
19

20 **E. The Proposed Method of Class Notice is Appropriate**

21 Rule 23(c)(2)(B) provides that, in any case certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the
22 court must direct to class members the “best notice practicable” under the
23 circumstances. Rule 23(c)(2)(B) does not require “actual notice” or that a notice be
24 “actually received.” *Silber v. Mabon*, 18 F.3d 1449, 1454 (9th Cir. 1994). Notice need
25 only be given in a manner “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
26 apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity
27 to present their objections.” *Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.*, 339 U.S.
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1 306, 314 (1950). “Adequate notice is critical to court approval of a class settlement
2 under Rule 23(e).” *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1025.

3 Pursuant to Rule 23(e)(1)(B), “[t]he court must direct notice in a reasonable
4 manner to all class members who would be bound by the proposal.” The notice must
5 concisely and clearly state in plain, easily understood language: (i) the nature of the
6 action; (ii) the definition of the class; (iii) the class claims, issues, or defenses; (iv) that
7 class members may enter an appearance through counsel if the member so desires; (v)
8 that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion, stating
9 when and how members may elect to be excluded; (vi) the time and manner for
10 requesting exclusion; and (vii) the binding effect of a class judgment on class members
11 under Rule 23(c)(3). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).

12 Here, the direct notice sent by both e-mail and U.S. Mail to all Members of the
13 Settlement Class for whom Defendant has a valid e-mail address and to the last known
14 mailing address contained in Defendant’s records meet all the notice requirements.
15 See SA § 4; Exhibit B attached thereto. In addition, Class Counsel’s website will
16 allow Settlement Class Members to access a copy of the direct e-mail and mail notice
17 and the Settlement Agreement. *See* Exhibit B.

18 The Class Counsel and Defendant agree that the method of notice set forth in the
19 Settlement Agreement constitutes the best form of notice to the Settlement Class that is
20 practicable under the circumstances. Defendant, Lands’ End, shall pay all costs
21 associated with disseminating and publishing the Notice to the Settlement Class and all
22 associated expenses, which shall be in addition to and not deducted from the settlement
23 compensation or the amount of attorneys’ fees and expenses described in the
24 Settlement Agreement. *See* SA §§ 4, 6, 12.

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1 **VII. THE REQUIREMENTS OF FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) ARE ALSO MET**

2 In addition to meeting the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
3 representation requirements of Rule 23(a), the proposed class must also meet one of
4 the three provisions of Rule 23(b). It is the Parties’ position that the class may be
5 certified under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

6 For certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), a two-pronged test must be met.
7 First, “questions of law or fact common to class members [must be found to
8 predominate over questions affecting only individual members.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
9 23(b)(3). Additionally, the Court must find that “a class action is superior to other
10 available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” *Id.* In
11 reaching its conclusions, the Rule requires a Court to consider the interests of
12 individual members of the class in controlling their own individual litigation, the
13 nature and extent of any existing parallel litigation, the desirability of concentrating the
14 litigation in one forum and the manageability of the class action. Fed. R. Civ. P.
15 23(b)(3); see *Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor*, 521 U.S. 591, 615-16 (1997). The
16 Court will find that the Rule 23(b)(3) criteria have been met.

17 **A. Common Questions Predominate**

18 The predominance inquiry considers whether “questions of law or fact common
19 to the class will predominate over any questions affecting only individual members as
20 the litigation progresses.” *Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Retirement Plans & Trust Funds*, 133
21 S. Ct. 1184, 1195 (2013). This analysis starts with the underlying causes of action.
22 *Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co.*, 133 S. Ct. 2179, 2184 (2011).

23 Here, Defendant’s alleged misrepresentation regarding the country of origin of
24 the product at issue in this Action clearly predominates over any questions affecting
25 only individual members of the Settlement Class. As such, individual issues
26 concerning identification of prospective class members and entitlement to actual
27

1 damages are capable of determination and considered “ancillary to the Court’s
2 evaluation of the predominantly common issues.” *Wyatt v. Creditcare, Inc.*, 2005 WL
3 2780684, *5 (N.D. Cal., October 25, 2005). Therefore, the “predominance”
4 requirement is met.

5 **B. A Class Action is Superior to Other Methods of Adjudication**

6 The law favors settlements, particularly in class actions and complex cases
7 where substantial resources can be conserved by avoiding the time, costs and rigors of
8 prolonged litigation. *Van Bronkhorst v. Safeco Corp.*, 529 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir.
9 1976); CONTE & NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11.41(2003)
10 [“By their very nature, because of the uncertainties of outcome, difficulties of proof,
11 length of litigation, class action suits lend themselves readily to compromise.”].
12 Furthermore, the size of individual claims is usually so small there is little incentive to
13 sue individually.
14

15 Here, the parties have stipulated and agreed that the putative Settlement Class
16 consisting of 38 members shall be awarded the full amount of their purchase price of
17 the product at issue, plus interest at a rate of ten (10) percent per annum. Thus, the
18 proposed Settlement largely achieves what Plaintiff would strive to achieve at trial,
19 without the use of additional resources, the inherent delay of continued litigation, or
20 the risks of an adverse trial verdict or necessity for a potential appeal.

21 Finally, concerns of judicial efficiency and consistency favor litigating the
22 propriety of the Defendant’s conduct by all class members in one action rather than
23 several individual suits. Moreover, the Defendant, class representatives and a vast
24 majority of the putative class members reside in this district, therefore the current
25 venue is ideal. In light of the Congressional intent behind consumer protection laws
26 such as those at issue in this Action, a class action under the circumstances presented
27 here would be superior to any other method of adjudication.
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VIII. THE PARTIES JOINTLY REQUEST AN ORDER APPROVING THE PROPOSED CLASS SETTLEMENT

The law favors settlement, particularly in class actions and other complex cases where substantial judicial resources can be conserved by avoiding formal litigation." *In re Gen. Motors*, 55 F.3d 768, 784 (3d Cir.1995). Because the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 have been met, the parties respectfully request that the defined class be conditionally certified for settlement purposes and jointly request that the Court schedule a Final Approval Hearing. The parties respectfully request that the Court approve and adopt the parties' proposed Settlement Agreement.

By settling this matter, both parties avoid the expense of trial and uncertainty of outcome. If this matter proceeded to trial the net value of the recovery would be further decreased due to the costs of compelling further discovery, retaining expert witnesses, preparing for trial and possibly, engaging in post trial matters, including the lodging of an appeal. The Court, after reviewing the terms negotiated upon by the parties, will find that the settlement reached will be fair, adequate and reasonable for all involved. Therefore, the circumstances of this matter, as discussed above, heavily weigh in favor of the proposed settlement.

IX. A FINAL APPROVAL HEARING SHOULD BE SCHEDULED

The last step in the settlement approval process is the formal fairness hearing or final approval hearing, at which time the Court may hear all evidence and arguments, for and against, to evaluate the proposed Settlement. A true and correct copy of the parties' proposed Final Approval Order is attached to the Agreement as Exhibit C.

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1 **X. CONCLUSION**

2 For the foregoing reasons, the parties respectfully request that the Court (1)
3 grant preliminary approval of the proposed Settlement, (2) approve the proposed
4 Notice procedure an the form, manner and content of the Notice, (3) stay all
5 proceedings until the Court renders a final decision regarding the approval of the
6 Settlement, (4) conditionally certify the proposed Settlement Class, (5) appoint
7 Plaintiff as Class Representative and Plaintiff’s Counsel, Abbas Kazerounian and
8 Joshua B. Swigart as Class Counsel, and (6) schedule a hearing for Final Approval.
9

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11
12 Dated: February 12, 2016

Respectfully submitted,
KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC

13
14 BY: /s/ Abbas Kazerounian
15 ABBAS KAZEROUNIAN, ESQ.
16 MONA AMINI, ESQ.
17 *Attorneys for Plaintiff*
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19
20 Dated: February 12, 2016

Respectfully submitted,
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